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ABSTRACT 
 
The threat of credit card fraud is arguably the most serious issue of concern to e-commerce 
participants, including consumers and merchants.  SSL/TLS and SET are two widely discussed means 
of securing online credit card payments. Because of implementation issues, SET has not really been 
adopted by e-commerce participants, whereas, despite the fact that it does not address all security 
issues, SSL/TLS is commonly used for Internet e-commerce security. The three-domain (3D) security 
schemes, including 3-D Secure and 3D SET, have recently been proposed as ways of improving e-
commerce transaction security. These schemes can provide the participants in an e-commerce 
transaction with a greater range of security services than provided by naive use of SSL/TLS, without 
introducing significant implementation complexity for merchant or consumer. However, in e-
commerce, not only security requirements but also implementation requirements must be considered. 
This article contrasts the effectiveness of 3-D Secure and 3D SET in meeting e-commerce end-user 
requirements, including both security and implementation issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
Electronic commerce or e-commerce provides participants, including consumers and merchants, with a 
number of benefits, such as convenience and time savings.  E-commerce transactions can be 
categorised into business to business (B2B), business to consumer (B2C), consumer to consumer 
(C2C), and public/private sectors to government (Hassler, 2001); we focus on B2C transactions in this 
paper. 
In B2C transactions, the credit card is the most widely used method of payment for Internet e-
commerce transactions (Treese and Stewart, 1998). According to an Internet shopping habits survey 
conducted by Survey.Net (http://www.survey.net), 36% of Internet users purchase goods by 
transmitting their credit card number via a secure form; the percentages for other payment methods are 
significantly lower. Given that the debit/credit card is the primary means for consumers to purchase 
products or services online, the possible compromise of credit card numbers is a serious threat to the 
consumer (Jarupunphol and Mitchell, 2001).  
As has already been discussed in elsewhere (see, for example, Bellman et al., 1999; Jarupunphol, 
2001; Jarupunphol, 2002a), many consumers perceive e-commerce as being riskier than other 
shopping methods.  These consumers are particularly concerned that their financial information, such 
as their credit card numbers, may be compromised. 
Moreover, not only do numerous consumers perceive that shopping via e-commerce is particularly 
risky, but also a number of e-commerce business organisations believing that the likelihood of fraud in 
e-commerce is higher than for non e-commerce transactions. According to the Information Security 
Breaches Survey (DTI, 2002), some business opinions regarding e-commerce security are as follows. 
• 61% of UK businesses believe that e-commerce systems are more of a target for fraud than 
non e-commerce systems, 
• 32% believe that e-commerce and non e-commerce systems are equally a target for fraud, and 
• only 7% think that e-commerce systems are less of a target for fraud than non e-commerce 
systems. 
Consequently, various methods have been proposed to address the security risks arising in e-
commerce. 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or the SSL-based protocol Transport Layer Security (TLS) (Rescorla, 
2001) are almost always used in preference to Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) (Merkow et al., 
1998; SET, 1997a; SET, 1997b) for Internet e-commerce transaction security. This is primarily 
because, despite comprehensively meeting all security requirements, SET fails to meet end-user 
implementation requirements.  SSL/TLS, on the other hand, whilst being simple to implement, does 
not meet all the end-user security requirements. Recently, the three-domain (3D) architecture (Wrona 
et al., 2001) has been introduced to try and meet both security and implementation requirements.  Two 
main examples of 3D schemes have been proposed, namely 3-Domain Secure (Gpayments, 2002; Visa 
3-D Secure, 2001a; Visa 3-D Secure, 2001b), which builds on the SSL/TLS protocol, and 3D SET 
(Bonnie and Vaninetti, 2001; Wrona et al., 2001), which is a 3D version of SET. 
In this paper, we consider how well e-commerce end-user requirements are fulfilled by these two 3D 
schemes. 
2. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF SSL/TLS AND SET 
Before considering the 3D protocols which are the main subject of this paper, we start by considering 
the main advantages and disadvantages of the SET and SSL/TLS protocols when used for e-commerce 
security.  This serves as a background for the discussion of the two 3D protocols, given that they are 
 based on these schemes.  For more detailed discussion of these issues see, for example, Jarupunphol 
and Mitchell (2002c). 
2.1. Brief analysis of SSL/TLS 
The main advantages of SSL/TLS, when used to protect e-commerce transactions, are as follows. 
• Ease of use for e-commerce end-users.  The cardholder can use SSL/TLS completely 
transparently because it is already built into commonly used web browsers, and merchants can 
also implement SSL/TLS without changing their payment model in any way. 
• The system is not complex, resulting in minimal impact on transaction speed. 
The main disadvantages of SSL/TLS for e-commerce are as follows. 
• The merchant cannot reliably identify the cardholder.  In cases where consumers use a stolen 
credit card to initiate e-commerce transactions, merchants are responsible for ‘card not 
present’ transaction charge backs (Caunter, 2001; Treese and Stewart, 1998). 
• Since SSL/TLS only protects the communications link between consumer and merchant, it 
does nothing to protect sensitive cardholder information whilst it is stored at the merchant 
server.  Merchants therefore need to implement additional security measures to protect the 
secrecy of this information. 
• SSL-based e-commerce permits the merchant to see consumer payment information, 
potentially causing security concerns to cardholders. 
2.2. Brief analysis of SET 
The main advantages of SET are as follows. 
• SET ensures the confidentiality of payment information at all stages of transaction processing, 
including data transmission and data storage. 
• SET prevents the merchant from seeing consumer payment information, since the payment 
information is forwarded to the acquirer in encrypted form (encrypted using the acquirer' s 
public key). 
• To ensure merchant privacy, SET prevents the acquirer from seeing consumer order 
information stored at the merchant web server. 
The main disadvantages of SET are as follows. 
• Implementing SET is more costly than SSL/TLS for both consumers and merchants. 
• Using SET is much more complicated than using SSL. 
• SET does not permit the cardholder to place an order from PCs other than the cardholder’s 
SET-initialised PC because the cardholder' s private key required to conduct a SET transaction 
is stored in this PC. 
• SET employs complex cryptographic mechanisms that may result in an unacceptable 
transaction speed. 
3. THE 3-DOMAIN E-PAYMENT ARCHITECTURE 
Before considering the 3-D Secure and 3D SET payment systems in detail, we introduce the 3-Domain 
(3D) payment model which underlies them both. 
 3.1. Participants 
In electronic payment systems (Hassler, 2001), there are four main types of participant, namely 
consumers, merchants, issuers, and acquirers. These roles are also required in 3D-based payment 
systems. In addition, a payment gateway, which is an entity responsible for providing access to 
payment authorization functions and for capturing payment information in an online financial 
exchange, is required. 
The roles of these participants can be summarised as follows. 
Consumer (C) – The entity that purchases products or services from the merchant via the Internet. 
Merchant (M) – The entity that sells products or services to the consumer via the Internet. 
Issuer (I) – The entity that issues the consumer a credit card and also responds to an online payment 
request from the acquirer via the payment gateway. 
Acquirer (A) – The entity that forwards the payment request from the merchant to the issuer via the 
payment gateway. 
3.2. The three domains 
3-D Secure and 3D SET are built upon the relationships between three ‘domains’, namely the acquirer, 
issuer, and interoperability domains (Bounie and Vaninetti, 2001; Visa 3-D Secure, 2002a; Visa 3-D 
Secure, 2002b; Wrona et al., 2001). 
Acquirer Domain – The acquirer domain covers the relationship between the merchant and acquirer. 
Issuer Domain – The issuer domain covers the relationship between the cardholder and the issuer. 
Interoperability Domain – The relationship between the acquirer and issuer domains is supported by 
the interoperability domain. 
4. 3-D SECURE AND 3D SET 
We now give an overview of the 3-D Secure and 3D SET payment systems. 
4.1. 3-D Secure 
The 3-D Secure payment system can be regarded as the integration of SSL with the 3D model. As 
mentioned above, when used simply to protect the cardholder-merchant link, SSL/TLS does not 
provide verification of the cardholder, which can result in credit card fraud at the consumer side. 
Integration of the 3D architecture with SSL can help address this issue. 3-D Secure, originally known 
as 3D SSL, was developed by Visa. 
In 3-D Secure, the payment gateway, which provides an interface between the merchant/acquirer' s 
payment system and the Visa proprietary payment network VisaNet, must be implemented in the 
acquirer domain (Visa 3-D Secure, 2002b). Merchants are responsible for installing an SSL/TLS 
Merchant Plug-In (MPI) at their servers, as would normally be the case if they wish to implement 
SSL/TLS for consumer-merchant communication protection. For 3-D Secure, this MPI is required to 
have additional functions to handle communication with a centralized Visa directory (GPayments 
(2001; Gpayments, 2002). 
Within the Issuer domain, each card issuer is required to maintain a special server known as the 
Access Control Server (ACS). The ACS is used to support cardholder authentication. 
The Visa directory is a server in the Interoperability domain, used to enable communications between 
merchant servers and card issuers. 
 To protect the security of communications between the various entities, 3-D Secure requires the 
following links to be protected using SSL/TLS: cardholder-merchant, cardholder-ACS, merchant-Visa 
Directory, and Visa Directory-ACS, Visa 3-D Secure (2002b). 
Figure 1 shows how 3-D Secure operates (Visa 3-D Secure, 2002a; Visa 3-D Secure, 2002b; Wrona et 
al., 2001) (see also the explanation below the figure). The numbered steps shown in figure 1 are 
explained below. In this explanation, C, M, I, A and VDir denote the Cardholder, Merchant, Issuer, 
Acquirer and Visa directory respectively. 
 
 
Figure 1: The 3-D Secure transaction procedure 
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transaction have been decided. In this process, all purchasing information transmitted to the merchant 
server will be protected by SSL/TLS. 
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browser back to the MPI and sends a payment verification signed by the issuer. 
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4.2. 3D SET 
3D SET (Server-based SET) is another 3D payment scheme that predates 3-D Secure. 3D SET was 
developed by a number of SET software vendors (Gpayments, 2001), and maps the SET payment 
system into the 3D model. As a replacement for the traditional SET digital wallet that must be stored 
at a consumer PC, 3D SET uses a SET Wallet Server in the issuer domain.  The cardholder' s certificate 
is also securely stored at the issuer' s secure server. 
Within the acquirer domain, there is no need for the merchant to have a certificate installed at the 
merchant server. As in the issuer domain, the acquirer stores the merchant' s certificate and implements 
the payment gateway at the acquirer secure server. 
Figure 2 shows how 3D SET operates. The 3D SET transaction procedure involves the following main 
steps, as indicated in Figure 2. In this explanation, and as previously, C, M, I and A denote the 
Cardholder, Merchant, Issuer and Acquirer respectively. 
 
  
Figure 2: The 3D SET transaction procedure 
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requests entry of secret authentication information (SAR). 
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successful, the issuer will perform the SET transaction. 
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rdholder. 
5. OVERVIEW OF E-COMMERCE END-USER REQUIREMENTS FOR E-
PAYMENT SCHEMES 
This paper measures the effectiveness of the proposed 3D protocols against e-commerce end-user 
requirements.  The end-user requirements must therefore first be defined. Note that e-commerce end-
users here include both consumers who use the Internet to purchase products or services, and 
 merchants who provide such services to consumers. Understanding end-user requirements, however, is 
very complicated, since end-user perceptions of innovative technologies can be influenced by various 
factors, including via the members of a social system (Roger, 1983). 
 
In order to get a clear picture of e-commerce end-user requirements, we divide requirements into 
different categories.  In particular we focus here on security requirements and implementation 
requirements.  There are reasons to believe that these are two particularly important categories of 
requirements.  First note that security requirements have driven the design of such systems as SET, 
and it is perceptions about the security, or more precisely the lack of security, that prevent many 
potential users of e-commerce from engaging in it.  
 
Second, observe that, as pointed out in Jarupunphol and Mitchell (2002b, 2002d), SET has failed to 
meet e-commerce end-user requirements because of implementation issues, in spite of providing a full 
set of security services. Thus, despite the fact that the end-users are very concerned about the security 
of their sensitive information, system developers cannot ignore implementation factors. 
5.1. Security requirements for e-payment schemes 
Hassler (2001) states that security requirements for electronic payment systems include 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation. Following this approach, the following 
security requirements can be identified for the e-commerce end-users.  
• Payment confidentiality – Consumer financial information must be kept confidential, 
including during transmission and storage.  Here, the consumer is the entity requiring the 
confidentiality service, while the merchant is the entity providing the service. 
• Payment integrity – The integrity of the transaction must be protected, including during 
transmission and storage. Both consumer and merchant require this service. 
• Entity authentication – Both consumers and merchants require entity authentication services in 
order to verify the identity of the entities with whom they are dealing. 
• Non-repudiation – The transaction must have such services that enable one party to prevent 
another party denying having taken a particular action, e.g. sending order/payment 
information, confirmation of order/payment. Both consumer and merchant also require this 
service. 
5.2. Implementation requirements for e-payment schemes 
We focus here on the major barriers causing implementation failures in SET schemes (Jarupunphol 
and Mitchell, 2002b, 2002d) including usability, flexibility, affordability, speed of transaction, and 
interoperability. Apart from these requirements, it is important to consider another major factor, 
namely whether e-commerce end-users can actually use the payment scheme. That is, is the system 
ready for the consumer and merchant to implement?  Thus we also consider availability as one of the 
implementation requirements. 
 
In addition to availability, reliability is also an important factor to be considered, as it ensures that the 
software or system will perform appropriately. In (IEEE STD610.12, 1990; Musa and Everett, 1990; 
Whittaker and Voas, 2000), software reliability is defined as the probability that software will not 
cause the failure of a system for a specified time under specified conditions. Furthermore, data input 
and output must be correctly displayed by the given functions. In e-commerce, this means that the data 
inputs of consumers (e.g. order, payment, and billing information) and merchant transaction 
information must be correctly displayed to consumers by their Web browser.   
 
Hence the following end-user implementation requirements can be identified. 
 • Usability – The system must be easy to implement, including installation.  The consumer 
requires the card issuer and merchant to provide a secure system that is not complex, while the 
merchant requires the acquirer and security software developers to provide a simple 
application that meets the security requirements. 
• Flexibility – The system must allow e-commerce consumers to order products or services from 
any location, and not just from one PC. Here, the consumer is the entity requiring the 
flexibility service, while the merchant is the entity providing the service. 
• Affordability – The costs of implementing and using the system must be affordable for 
consumers and merchants, since these end-users are unlikely to be prepared to pay 
significantly extra to participate in Internet e-commerce transactions. For example, consumers 
are not willing to pay for a digital certificate in order to conduct e-commerce transactions 
although it is required in some e-payment scheme such a SET (Jarupunphol and Mitchell, 
2002d). Merchants will also not wish to invest significantly in engineering e-payment 
infrastructure (Treese and Stewart, 1998). 
• Reliability – The system must be reliable since it is used for the transmission and 
manipulation of sensitive information. 
• Availability – The system must be available when needed.  
• Speed of transaction – The transaction speed must be acceptable for e-commerce end-users. 
• Interoperability – The system must be interoperable between different computing platforms, 
web browsers and server software packages in order to enable its use by the widest possible 
spectrum of e-commerce consumers and merchants. 
6. ASSESSING 3-D SECURE AND 3D SET AGAINST THE END-USER 
REQUIREMENTS 
We now measure 3-D Secure and 3D SET against the e-commerce end-user requirements identified in 
the previous section. 
6.1. Security requirements 
We first consider the security requirements identified in Section 5.2. 
Confidentiality Both 3-D Secure and 3D SET provide for the encryption of payment information 
using state of the art cryptographic techniques.  Note, however, that in 3-D Secure the merchant has 
access to all the consumer’s payment information, just as would be the case in today’s typical 
environment, where SSL/TLS is used to protect the customer-merchant Internet link. 
Integrity Although traditional SSL alone cannot provide payment integrity for stored data, 3-D Secure 
can address this problem, since the payment information (PI) must be authorised and signed by the 
issuer prior to passing to the merchant.  In 3D SET, the integrity provisions supported by SET still 
apply, although the process is performed via the interoperability domain where the issuer holds the 
cardholder’s certificate and the acquirer holds the merchant' s certificate. 
End entity verification Both 3-D Secure and 3D SET provide a measure of mutual authentication 
between merchant and consumer. In 3-D Secure, authentication of merchant to cardholder is supported 
by the use of SSL, whereas authentication of cardholder to merchant is performed indirectly through 
the use of the ACS (that is, the ACS vouches to the merchant that it has authenticated the cardholder). 
 In 3D SET, the issuer authenticates the cardholder, and the acquirer is responsible for ensuring that it 
is communicating with the correct merchant, and hence mutual authentication is therefore performed 
via the interoperability domain. 
 Non-repudiation Because of the end entity verification mechanisms provided by both 3-D Secure and 
3D SET, consumers and merchants cannot deny having participated in a completed transaction. The 
consumer cannot deny ordering products or services from the merchant, and the merchant also cannot 
deny having received the consumer order. Hence both 3-D Secure and 3D SET effectively meet 
consumer and merchant security requirements. 
6.2. Implementation requirements 
3-D Secure and 3D SET are next further assessed against the implementation requirements identified 
in Section 5.3. 
Usability 3-D Secure has the major advantage for the merchant that it preserves the payment model 
used for existing SSL/TLS-protected e-commerce transactions. Initialisation is also simple for both 
merchant and cardholder; the merchant simply needs to install a special plug-in on his/her server, and 
the cardholder needs no special software and must simply follow an on-line enrolment process with 
the card issuer, using a ‘standard’ web browser.  
3D SET is also simple to initialise, since the cardholder does not need to generate his/her own key pair 
and obtain a certificate – all this is taken care of by the card issuer.  Similarly, the merchant 
initialisation is also simple, since the acquirer takes care of the key management and certification for 
the merchant. However, unlike 3-D Secure, the payment model for 3D SET is now different to the 
current mode of operation, and more significant changes will be necessary to the payment application 
running on the merchant server. 
Flexibility Both 3-D Secure and 3D SET have the desirable property that they can be used from any 
PC, as is currently the case for e-commerce transactions relying simply on SSL/TLS for cardholder-
merchant communications security.  This is achieved since neither of these 3D schemes require special 
software or keying material to be installed on the e-commerce PC. 
Affordability In 3D SET, merchants are still required to have a point-of-sale (POS) application to 
send a SET Wake-up message in reply to a SET request message from the cardholder.  In addition, the 
POS application is also used in order to communicate with the payment gateway installed at the 
acquirer' s server. Although it is not clear whether consumers need to pay for their 3D SET certificate, 
we assume here that there is more investment in using 3D SET than using 3-D Secure because of the 
requirement for the POS application at the merchant web server. 
Reliability The 3-D Secure Merchant Plug-In and the merchant software for 3D SET must also 
perform their functions correctly. Although implementation failures of these 3D protocols have not yet 
been reported, this is not surprising because of their recent emergence. Nevertheless, it can reasonably 
be assumed that the likelihood of system failures is low, since these two 3D protocols are supported by 
large reputable organisations. 
Of course, whilst the presence of incorrect functionality in security critical elements of 
implementations of the 3D schemes is unlikely, there is still a significant possibility that accidental 
vulnerabilities will be present in implementations of the schemes. Past experience indicates that it is 
very difficult to produce software which does not possess vulnerabilities (e.g. arising through buffer 
overflows) exploitable by malicious software. 
Availability One of the major issues with SET is the problem of availability.  Consumers can perform 
all the work of installing SET on their PC, but they cannot use it unless merchants also install SET at 
their servers.  Consumers will certainly not wish to go to the trouble of performing the installation 
unless they are convinced that SET will be of immediate practical benefit to them.  In exactly the same 
way, merchants will not wish to invest in a costly SET implementation unless they are convinced that 
a significant number of consumers will have the necessary SET installation to use their SET 
transaction service. 
 This issue is to a large extent avoided by 3-D Secure.  Of course, as with any such system, 3-D Secure 
requires card issuers and acquirers to implement the system before anyone else – however, there are a 
relatively small number of such entities. Once the acquirer and issuer support is in place, merchants 
can install 3-D Secure in the knowledge that consumers will be immediately capable of using the 
system, since consumers do not need to install any new software on their PC (they simply need to 
carry out a simple registration process which can be totally web based).  Equally, consumers will be 
relatively happy to perform a simple web registration process, since the time required will be minimal, 
and there will be no software to install or letters to write.  Thus availability should not be an issue for 
3-D Secure. 
Similar arguments apply to 3D SET.  Customers can be enrolled using a simple process, and it will be 
much simpler to convince merchants that the (smaller) investment necessary to use 3D SET will have 
a speedy return.  However, it is also true that, as discussed under ‘Usability’ above, since Merchants 
will have to adopt a somewhat different payment model to use 3D SET, there are greater availability 
issues with this scheme than with 3-D Secure. 
Speed of transaction 3-D Secure primarily employs SSL/TLS (Visa 3-D Secure, 2002b) to meet 
security requirements. Apart from this, in 3-D Secure there are other features that may affect the 
transaction performance, including using the Visa Directory and the Issuer ACS to verify the 
cardholder’s identity.  
By contrast, 3D SET uses complex cryptographic mechanisms to secure entire e-commerce 
transactions, e.g. certification among participants, protection mechanisms for consumer and merchant 
sensitive information, etc. 
It is difficult to decide which 3D scheme is more effective with regard to transaction speed, for the 
following reasons. 
• It is possible for Issuer and Acquirer servers to perform SET operations very quickly, as long 
as appropriate hardware and software are used. 
• In both schemes the central servers may prove to be a bottleneck. 
• Apart from software/hardware requirements, high-speed networking is required to enable the 
various necessary interactions to be performed quickly. 
Interoperability How well 3-D Secure and 3D SET meet the interoperability requirement remains 
unproven, since the two systems have not yet been widely deployed.  However, since neither system 
relies on special software being installed on the consumer PC, and instead makes use of ‘standard’ 
browser features, interoperability issues are less likely to arise. 
In 3-D Secure, the only remaining problems would appear to be merchant – Visa Directory 
interactions.  This link is protected using ‘standard’ means (i.e. SSL/TLS), and also there is only one 
Visa Directory – thus again interoperability should not be a major problem. 
In 3D SET, interoperability between merchant server and acquirer server should not be an issue, since 
we assume that the merchant software is supplied by the acquirer.  This only leaves interactions 
between issuer and acquirer servers.  Whilst interoperability problems could arise here if 
cryptographic and other SET functionality is provided by different vendors, the numbers of parties 
involved should be sufficiently small that such problems can be overcome quickly. 
In summary, both the 3D schemes would appear to have fewer potential interoperability problems than 
SET.  However, 3-D Secure would appear to offer a slight advantage over 3D SET, given that the 
complex cryptographic functionality in SET is likely to be one possible cause of interoperability 
issues. 
 6.3. 3-D Secure or 3D SET? 
We now summarise and compare how well the two 3D schemes meet the identified end-user 
requirements. Table 1 gives a comparison between the two 3D protocols with respect to e-commerce 
end-user requirements. 
 
 
E-commerce end-users Requirements 
Consumer Merchant 
Effectiveness 
against end-users 
Comments 
Security 3D 
SET 
3-D 
Secure 
3D 
SET 
3-D 
Secure 
 
Confidentiality Yes Yes* Yes Yes 3D SET (marginally) The merchant has access to all 
the consumer’s payment 
information 
Integrity Yes Yes Yes Yes Equally effective Both 3D SET and 3-D Secure 
meet the requirements 
Verification Yes Yes Yes Yes Equally effective Both 3D SET and 3-D Secure 
meet the requirements 
Non-repudiation Yes Yes Yes Yes Equally effective Both 3D SET and 3-D Secure 
meet the requirements 
Implementation 3D 
SET 
3-D 
Secure 
3D 
SET 
3-D 
Secure 
 
Usability Yes Yes Yes* Yes 3-D Secure The payment model for 3D 
SET is different to the current 
mode of operation 
Flexibility Yes Yes Yes Yes Equally effective Both 3D SET and 3-D Secure 
meet the requirements 
Affordability Yes Yes Yes* Yes 3-D Secure More investment in using 3D 
SET than using 3-D Secure 
Reliability Yes Yes Yes Yes Equally effective Both 3D SET and 3-D Secure 
meet the requirements 
Availability Yes Yes Yes* Yes 3-D Secure Usability issues 
Speed of 
transaction 
N/A* N/A* N/A* N/A* Unclear Appropriate hardware and 
software, bottleneck, high 
speed networking 
Interoperability Yes Yes Yes Yes 3-D Secure 
(marginally) 
Cryptographic and other SET 
functionality provided by 
different vendors 
 
Table 1: 3-D Secure and 3D SET versus e-commerce consumer requirements 
 
As can be seen from the table, 3-D Secure and 3D SET can both fulfil end-user security requirements 
because of the strong cryptographic algorithms deployed by the protocols and the issuer 
server/cardholder interaction that provides entity verification at the client side (consumer).  Thus we 
suggest that 3-D Secure and 3D SET are equally effective in securing Internet e-commerce 
transactions, if security is the only concern. Note, however, that 3D SET has a slight advantage with 
respect to confidentiality since the merchant server does not have access to the cardholder payment 
details. 
However, the differences between 3D SET and 3-D Secure are more significant when we consider the 
effectiveness of the two schemes in meeting implementation requirements. Although the speed of 
transaction issue still seems to be a potential barrier to both these 3D schemes, the 3-D Secure scheme 
appears to be a better fit to the implementation requirements. Nevertheless, apart from certain issues at 
the merchant side, 3D SET is also capable of meeting end-user requirements.  
 These results indicate that, although 3D SET offers slight advantages over 3-D Secure in fulfilling e-
commerce end-user security concerns, overall 3D SET performs less well than 3-D Secure in meeting 
the identified requirements. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As has already been discussed, issues of concern to e-commerce end-users can be addressed by either 
3-D Secure or 3D SET.  In addition, although both schemes appear to fit well to the identified 
implementation requirements, 3-D Secure has significant advantages over 3D SET. As a consequence, 
the 3-D Secure scheme would appear to be more likely to be widely used for future e-payment 
security. 
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